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Volume 44 Winter 1979 Number 1
ERA, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
ALLEGATIONS OF GENDER BIAS
Wallace Mendelson*
Some see the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) as indispens-
able to womanly freedom in America. For others it is a dangerous effort by
a miniscule, militant minority to use the constitution for symbolic self-
assertion. Each of these views is buttressed with word-play often more ar-
dent than accurate. A common argument, for example, holds that ERA is
necessary to counteract what has been called the Supreme Court's "almost
josephic aversion to women."' In a famous article published at the end of
the Warren Era we were told the justices' approach to women's rights has
been characterized, since the 1870s, by two prominent features: "a vague
but strong substantive belief in women's 'separate place,' and an extra-
ordinary methodological casualness in reviewing state legislation based on
such stereotypical views of women." 2 In support of this and similar charges
the following cases are commonly cited:3 Bradwell v. State,4 sustaining an
Illinois rule against the practice of law by women; Minor v. Happersett,5
upholding a Missouri law against female suffrage; Muller v. Oregon,6
ivhich distinguished between men and women with respect to maximum-
* Professor of Government, University of Texas. B.A. 1933, Ph.D 1940,
University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1936, Harvard University.
1. This terminology comes from R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 73
(1960).
2. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 875-76
(1971).
3. See, e.g., K. DAVIDSON & R. GINSBURG, SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION:
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 4-25 (1974); B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E.
NORTON & S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, CAUSES AND REMEDIES
4-105 (1975); R. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 73, Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello:
Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 441 (1975); Note, Exclusion of Pregnancy from Coverage of Disability
Benefits Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 488 (1975).
4. 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
5. 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
6. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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hour legislation; Goesaert v. Cleary,7 the restricting barmaid case; and
Geduldig v. Aiello,8 sustaining a California disability insurance program
that excluded normal pregnancy. This article will suggest that these deci-
sions (like a few others based thereon)9 do not even remotely support the
charge of "sexism" in the work of the high court.
Bradwell, the anti-female-lawyer case, rests with little independent
discussion upon its companion decision in the Slaughter House Cases'0
decided one day earlier. There lies the key to much of our problem. It is
crucial that Slaughter House was the first case in which the Court con-
strued the fourteenth amendment- and that the justices who participated
therein were not strangers to the national crises, and the discussions, that
produced this and the two other Civil War amendments. It is crucial also
to understand the circumstances of the case (which, one suggests, have
been too often misconceived). After extensive unplanned growth, New
Orleans was plagued with numerous small slaughtering establishments
within its boundaries. A city effort to mitigate that noxious problem failed
when several slaughterers evaded regulation by moving to a river site-above
the city, outside its jurisdiction. Dumping their waste into the river threat-
ened the urban water supply and created the danger of an outbreak of
cholera. In this impasse the state intervened. It prohibited all slaughtering
in the vicinity except at a designated site on the river below the city. There,
following a then familiar tradition, it induced some entrepreneurs to build
public slaughtering facilities in exchange for exclusive toll rights for
twenty-five years. These facilities were open to all who wished to slaughter
for the New Orleans market, subject of course to state-prescribed tolls and
health inspection. To dismiss this as a butchering monopoly (which is
rather less thai accurate), to dismiss it as the evil work of a carpetbag
legislature, is to miss the essence of the case. The plaintiffs' position was
comprehensive: by virtue of the fourteenth amendment no legislature
(carpetbag, or other) could intrude upon what they called "the personal
rights of men"-in this case, it seems, the right to continue slaughtering
within the boundaries of New Orleans." If this indeed were a fourteenth
amendment right or privilege, it would be difficult to imagine what would
7. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
8. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Williams v. McNair, 401
U.S. 951 (1971), aff'g 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), referred to in Brown,
Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 2, at 881.
10. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
11. Id., Brief for Plaintiff at 17. In their brief on reargument, at 37-38,
plaintiffs recognized the state's "police power" to deal with a common law
nuisance, but the law in question they argued "is a sweeping edict, that banishes
from three parishes an important and necessary occupation which prevails in
every community, an edict which inflicts injury upon hundreds of individuals in
their property and their business.. . ." It is noteworthy that the reasonableness of
the toll rates was not questioned. 83 U.S. at 65.
[Vol. 44
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not bet And so, as Holmes observed later, there would be "hardly any limit
but the sky" upon the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and upon
the power of judges to govern thereunder. 12
The Court met plaintiffs' expansive views head-on. It rejected substan-
tive due process, substantive equal protection, and substantive privileges
or irrmmunities-in favor of the view that:
No one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in [all three Civil War amendments], lying at the founda-
tions of each, and without which none of them would have been
even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the
newly-made freeman .... 13
In a word racism was the crux of the Civil War amendments as the Court
saw them in that early day. Accordingly just a few years after Slaughter
House the Court upheld under the fourteenth amendment perhaps the
first modern business regulation in Munn v. Illinoi 4 - but vetoed race
discrimination in Ex parte Virginia'5 and Strauder v. West Virginia.6
John A. Campbell who argued so broadly for the butchers had been a
member of the Supreme Court, and had resigned at the outbreak of the
Civil War to join the Confederacy. Had he not left the bench, and had
Slaughter House .been presented as in fact it was, the four dissenters
therein might have had a fifth vote-and American history might have
been rather different. Senator Matt Carpenter, who had served promi-
nently in the Congress which proposed the fourteenth amendment, was
counsel in opposition to the expansive view. His argument was prophetic.
Take care, Your Honors, he said in substance. Consider the consequences
of the step now urged upon you. It means you will be compelled to pass
upon the wisdom of a host of laws which in the public interest regulate the
manner in which business is carried on, such as the licensing of public call-
ings, the control of dangerous occupations, and "all existing laws regu-
lating and fixing the hours of labor, and prohibiting the employment of
children, women, and men in any particular occupations or places for
more than a certain number of hours per day. ' 17 Obviously he foresaw the
disaster of Lochner v. New York' inter alia.
12. Bildwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).
13. 83 U.S. at 71.
14. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
15. 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
16. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Mr. Justice Field who wrote the main dissent in
Slaughter House dissented also inMunn, but voted to uphold race discrimination
in Strauder and Expaarte Virginia, achieving thus a double perversion of the four-
teenth amendment.
17. C. FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT
1862-1890, at 181 (1939).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
1979]
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Most of counsels' argument in Slaughter House, most of the Court's
discussion, and most of the main dissenting opinion, rested on the priv-
ileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Bradwell,
which turned all but exclusively on that provision, was no more anti-
female than Slaughter House was anti-butcher. Neither case triggered the
fourteenth amendment, because neither involved a problem of race. Both
rejected laissez faire -the one with respect to butchering, the other with
respect to lawyering. Both entail a federalistic concern that (absent any
race problem) local businesses and avocations were within the state police
power after, no less than before, the fourteenth amendment. Moreover
just as Bradwell lost her privileges or immunities claim, so (with one excep-
tion soon overruled) has every man who has ever raised the issue. 19
A minority concurring opinion in Bradwell, it is true, was highly male-
chauvinistic by today's standards -though what was said there probably
reflected the general consensus of the day. How did such language get into
the minority opinion? Those who used it had dissented in Slaughter House
on laissez faire grounds. Logically they would have had to dissent in
Bradwell. Lawyering after all is a "business or avocation" and these they
had insisted should be substantially free of state interference. To uphold
the ban on female lawyers they had to find some reason for not applying
laissez faire principles in Bradwell. Sexism was the answer. Here is a classic
example of one gross error producing another. It is a classic example also
of what it would mean to have the Supreme Court abandon Slaughter
House in favor of judicial free-wheeling as urged by the plaintiffs and
dissenters therein. The fact remains, however, that the sexist views in ques-
tion were minority views, completely at odds with the Court's ratio
decidendi- though today's pro-ERA polemists do not always stress that
point. It is worth passing notice that while Bradwell was pending, "the
Illinois legislature.., passed an act giving all persons, regardless of sex,
freedom in selecting an occupation." 20
What has been said above equally disposes ofHappersett-the female-
suffrage case. If it involved no problem of race, it also involved no problem
of laissez faire. Still, voting-which it did involve-like local business was a
matter plainly reserved for the states. This was one of the major compro-
mises of the Constitutional Convention. Unable to agree upon voter
qualifications, the Founders resolved the dispute by leaving the problem
entirely to the discretion of each individual state.2 1 Whatever may be the
view of the man on the street, there is no constitutional connection what-
soever between suffrage and national citizenship. Nothing in the Constitu-
tion of the United States gives citizens as such the right to vote, nor does
19. The exception is Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), overruled,
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
20. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, supra note 3, at 6.
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
[Vol. 44
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anything therein deny it to aliens. Indeed for generations we gave the vote
to some aliens; we have always denied it to some citizens-male as well as
female. As the Happersett Court observed, the fifteenth amendment
would not have been necessary if the right to vote had been deemed a
privilege of federal citizenship. For the fourteenth amendment plainly
gave citizenship to Blacks.
Minor, like Bradwell, based her case not on the equal protection, but
on the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
While at first the latter was stressed in litigation, it soon passed into limbo.
Both conservative and liberals came to find it had shortcomings. Conser-
vatives, bent on promoting corporate business, soon recognized the dis-
utility of a constitutional provision that covers only citizens. It would seem
difficult to get a court to hold that corporations are citizens of the United
States (and thus as it was once argued, eligible for the presidency). Lib-
erals also became disenchanted. Citizenship after all is quite accidental. It
is people, i.e. persons (in the language of the Constitution) who are to be
protected. One of the glories of the Bill of Rights is that its shield is not
confined to the happenstance of citizenship. Thus for their own separate
reasons both conservative and liberals found it expedient to turn from
privileges or immunities to due process and equal protection.
Many young activists today feel cheated because the privileges clause
has been dismissed in effect as meaningless. Their concern arises from
carelessness with respect to history. They have lost nothing. Whatever acti-
vist judges- whether on the left or the right - could have read into the in-
trinsically meaningless privileges or immunities clause, they have proven
quite capable of reading into the due process and equal protection clauses
of the same amendment. And so it was that in the 1890s and thereafter
both wings of Slaughter House were abandoned. Laissez faire became the
law of the land, 22 and so in effect did racial discrimination under the guise
of "separate but equal." 23
Then came Muller v. Oregon24 which some members of the women's
movement -perhaps with tongue in cheek-cite as anti-feminist. This is
the case in the Court's darkest laissez faire era in which surprisingly it
upheld a maximum hour law for women. At the time and long thereafter
liberals generally-including such dedicated feminists as Florence Kelley
and Jane Addams-considered Muller a great victory. 25 Some sophisti-
cated women now deplore Muller because there the Court found it not
unreasonable for legislators to believe women might be peculiarly vulner-
able to long hours of employment. Surely the decision to uphold the law
was not unreasonable. Are we with hindsight to fault the Court for
22. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
25. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. RosS, supra note 3, at 39.
1979]
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reaching the "right" result by "wrong" reasoning-when that reasoning
reflected the most enlightened medical and sociological data of the day,
garnered in the famous Brandeis brief from all quarters of the western
world? All of us- including today's most enlightened women- run the risk
that our best thinking may seem quite simple-minded in the light of future
intellectual effortsl Was Adhins v. Children's Hospital26 indeed a better
decision? There the Court, reverting to type, invalidated a minimum-wage
law for women -thus treating men and women equally.
The statute at issue in Goesaert v. Cleary27 denied barmaid licenses to
all women except the wives and daughters of male bar owners. Challenged
by a female owner and a barmaid, the measure was upheld as within allow-
able legislative discretion. Standing alone, the decision may be doubtful.
What its critics often fail to recognize is that it was one of a series of deci-
sions28 by the Roosevelt Court reacting-perhaps overreacting-to the
"old Court's" substantive due process and equal protection abuses. For a
period of over twenty years beginning before Goesaert until late in the
Warren era only one measure was held invalid on substantive due process
or substantive equal protection grounds. That exception, Morey v.
Doud,29 plainly a sport, was later overruled.30 As late as 1961 the Warren
Court without dissent used the hands-off rule of the barmaid and related
cases to reject even a claim of religious freedom.31 What all these cases
mean (together with the contemporary desegregation cases32) is in effect a
return to Slaughter House and the historic purpose of the fourteenth
amendment. Here too, as usual, women were treated no differently from
men. The only exception is Muller which gave females preferential treat-
ment.
In Geduldig v. Aiello" the Court found no gender discrimination in a
California employee disability insurance program which denied coverage
for normal pregnancy. It did however cover abnormal pregnancies and
virtually all other disabilities, including prostate problems which are as
peculiarly masculine as pregnancy is feminine. This later point seems
meaningless, though counsel and dissenters made something of it. The in-
surance program did indeed cover purely male sickness, but it also equally
26. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
27. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
28. The leading cases are Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
29. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
30. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
32. The landmark case is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
33. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
[Vol. 44
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covered purely female sickness. In this respect both men and women had
equal protection for their different gender ailments.
Indeed so far was the program from discrimination against women
that the Supreme Court could observe:
[T]he appellant submitted to the District Court data that in-
dicated that both the annual claim rate and the annual claim cost
are greater for women than for men. As the District Court
acknowledged, "women contribute about 28 percent of the total
disability insurance fund and receive back about 38 percent of the
fund in benefits." Several amici curiae have represented to the
Court that they have had a similar experience under private
disability insurance programs. 34
Now to the real point which the Supreme Court made at best only im-
perfectly. The challenged classification did not divide men and women
into separate categories and treat them differently. For, even if we accept
the view that "discrimination" against some women is discrimination
against womankind, there is still this difficulty: a woman denied insurance
is hurt no more than her mate, who after all by law is fiscally responsible
for her care. The loss in question is a joint orfamily loss. The classification
thus is gender neutral. 35 In fiscal matters too, which is all that is here in-
volved, pregnant women do not tango alonel Or to change the figure,
California's insurance sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the
money cost of pregnancy were not a burden on both males and females,
i.e. if in fact it fell exclusively upon women, it would be unfair to ask male
workers to pay insurance premiums to cover that risk. Women workers in
that case ought to pay special increased premiums to cover the risk which is
said to be an exclusively female matter. The point is of course pregnancy is
not an exclusively female matter-fiscally or otherwise.
Finally there is no evidence of gender motivation in the California pro-
gram. The concern in excluding normal pregnancy- a relatively high cost
item-was to maintain the fiscal integrity of the program at premium
levels affordable by all workers.3 6 Yet why normal pregnancy instead of
heart attack (also a relatively high cost item)? Surely it is one thing to re-
quire all workers to pay via premiums for sickness that may fall fortuitously
upon any one of them; but something quite different to compel fellow
workers to pay for the often intended results of self-serving private con-
duct. Sickness yes; but not healthy pregnancy that is either intentional, or
34. Id. at 497 n.21 (citation omitted). See also the discussion id. at 493.
35. The California program's distinction between normal and abnormal
pregnancy reflects the difference between health and sickness. The abnormalcy
coverage was added only after the program had been challenged as discrimina-
tory against women. The addition apparently was not necessary to save the pro-
gram. See General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), where the goose-
gander equation would seem dispositive as in Geduldig.
36. 417 U.S. at 492-95.
1979]
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the result of a calculated effort to fool nature. In short, apart from rape,
pregnancy is always willful as compared to a heart attack. Moreover, given
Roe v. Wade,37 which some women foughtso valiantly to attain, disability
due to pregnancy is now voluntary as a matter of constitutional law. 38
Whatever else one may think of California's classification as a policy
choice, there is no evidence of anti-female bias either in motive or effect.
In short there was no "showing that [the California] distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against [females]. 39 Surely then there was no equal protection, and equal-
ly no ERA, problem. 40 The same perhaps cannot be said of California's
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. The dissenters in Geduldig observe that some voluntary disabilities,
e.g., some cosmetic surgery and sterilization, are insured. 417 U.S. at 499. These
however are in toto admittedly low cost items. If their inclusion in the program
amounts to constitutionally significant asymmetry, then surely the remedy is to
veto them, not to compel by judicial fiat the inclusion of bankrupting normal
pregnancy-simply for symmetry purposes. For, as the Court recognized, in-
surance for disability due to normal pregnancy is "so extraordinarily expensive
that it would be impossible to maintain a program supported by employee con-
tributions, if these disabilities are included." Id. at 493.
39. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974).
40. Congress indeed in proposing ERA seems to have provided in advance
for the Geduldig decision:
The legal principle underlying the equal rights amendment (H.J.
Res. 208) is that the law must deal with the individual attributes of the
particular person and not with stereotypes of over-classification based on
sex. However, the original resolution does not require that women must
be treated in all respects the same as men. "Equality" does not mean
"sameness." As a result, the original resolution would not prohibit
reasonable classifications based on characteristics that are unique to one
sex.
Equal Rights for Men and Women, S. REP. No. 92-689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). This and much of the pro-ERA discussion in Congress rests on Brown,
Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 2, part III. See, e.g., the discussion id. at
893:
B. Laws Dealing with Physical Characteristics Unique to One Sex
The fundamental legal principle underlying the Equal Rights
Amendment, then, is that the law must deal with particular attributes of
individuals, not with a classification based on the broad and impermis-
sible attribute of sex. This principle, however, does not preclude legisla-
tion (or other official action) which regulates, takes into account, or
otherwise deals with a physical characteristic unique to one sex. In this
situation it might be said that, in a certain sense, the individual obtains a
benefit or is subject to a restriction because he or she belongs to one or
the other sex. Thus a law relating to wet nurses would cover only women
and a law regulating the donation of sperm would restrict only men.
Legislation of this kind does not, however, deny equal rights to the other
sex. So long as the law deals only with a characteristic found in all (or
some) women but no men, or in all (or some) men but no women, it does
not ignore individual characteristics found in both sexes in favor of an
average based on one sex. Hence such legislation does not, without more,
violate the basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment.
[Vol. 44
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premium schedule which, as noted above, seems to put an unjustified
burden upon men (entirely apart from the normal pregnancy problem).41
The ultimate conclusion must be obvious: to the extent that ERA rests
on alleged Supreme Court bias against women in these oft-cited cases it is
without foundation. The matter may be put more broadly. With two inno-
cent exceptions both since abandoned, 42 Geduldig is, the only (allegedly
anti-female) equal protection case that women have lost in the Supreme
Court. Whether that decision sprang from sexism, neutral principle, or
whatever, surely there is no reason to believe the result would be different
under ERA. 43 The latter does not define what it prohibits any more clearly
than does the equal protection clause. Both of course outlaw anti-female
discrimination, but both leave the definition thereof, the application of
abstract principle to concrete circumstances, as well as the problems of
methodology and judicial remedy ultimately to judges. Thus in both con-
texts there is plenty of room for male chauvinism, if the Supreme Court
is- as charged-so inclined. The point is: ERA no less than equal protec-
tion would allow judges a wide range of discretion in both substance and
procedure- discretion that may be used to promote or frustrate the ideals
of the women's movement. It will not do to argue that ERA would be help-
ful in cases like Geduldig (the female's only equal protection "defeat") on
the ground that it would trigger "strict scrutiny. ' 44 For ERA-like equal
protection in this context-could not trigger anything in a case wherein
the Court finds (as in Geduldig) no gender classification. Nor is there any
reason, one suggests, for believing that even in appropriate cases josephic
judges would find ERA any more trigger-happy than the equal protection
clause.
Finally it is at least arguable that the Court has begun to treat gender
as a suspect classification when women are the victims 4 -and uphold
"benign discrimination" in their favor. 46 On that basis it might follow that
41. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
42. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), upheld a state law making jury ser-
vice voluntary for females, though it was compulsory for males. This decision was
in effect overruled in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). As to Goesaert-
the other alleged anti-female decision-see text accompanying note 27 supra. It
was disapproved in Craig-v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976). Those who
find in Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), affig 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), an invidious anti-female decision may want to consider the comments
in B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, supra note 3, at 582.
43. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
44. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
658 (1975).
45: Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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men would be the chief beneficiaries of ERA. 47 For benign discrimination
in favor of women-like one-sided "strict scrutiny" - is after all gender
discrimination against men.
47. See Barrett,Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1976).
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